In the last two decades, the fisheries of the North Sea have experienced substantial declines in the population of a number of commercially harvested species. The fisheries have also experienced the development of considerable overcapacity as a result of ineffective management and subsidies. Management of the fishery is complicated by the existence not only of multiple species and gears, but also multiple countries. Concerns about regional employment have also influenced management decisions to the detriment of the resource and industry. In this paper, the underlying factors that have shaped the current situation in the North Sea fisheries are discussed and potential solutions are explored.
Introduction
The decline in world fish stocks is an international phenomenon. FAO (2004) estimated that in 2003, 25% of world fish stocks were overexploited or depleted and in need of rebuilding. Other studies suggest that this is an underestimate of the level of overexploitation (e.g. Myers and Worm, 2003) . In contrast, around 10% of stocks were overexploited in the mid 1970s (FAO, 2004) .
European fisheries are no exception to this international trend in declining fish stocks. Despite the long-standing use of aggregate quota controls that attempt to the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and a series of decommissioning programmes in the last two decades aimed at reducing fleet size and capacity, the white fish stocks in the North Sea are currently both biologically and economically overexploited (Arnason et al., 2004) . In 2005, the cod quota, for example, was less than 28% of its level in 1999 and only 18% of that a decade earlier (see ICES, 2005) . The continuing decline in stocks of cod and other key species in the North Sea has resulted in the implementation of a multifaceted stock recovery programme that includes a range of management measures.
In this paper, the state of the fisheries in the North Sea is reviewed and the factors leading to their decline are discussed. The current management responses to the problems in the North Sea are reviewed and alternative responses are discussed.
The North Sea fisheries
The North Sea (Figure 1 ) is relatively unique in terms of European fisheries management. Although it contributes less than 20% of the total value of landings of all European vessels (STECF-SGECA, 2006) , it is the only fishing area fully under European jurisdiction.
1 As a result, it has the longest history of 'coordinated' management interventions of all European fisheries, being the first area subject to TAC controls with the implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 1983 (Daan, 1997 . In total, 23 species are currently subject to aggregate quota controls (i.e. TACs) in the North Sea, accounting for around 50% of the total value of landings from the area. The remaining non-quota species include inshore crustaceans and finfish, many of which are high value but low quantity species.
Commercial fishing activity in the North Sea is undertaken by fishers from the countries bordering the North Sea (UK, Denmark, The Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium and Norway), as well as Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Although Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands are not members of the European Union, they are members of the European Economic Area and as such, abide by the regulations imposed under the CFP through the imposition of complementary management measures on their fleets when operating in the North Sea. For The Netherlands and Belgium, nearly all landings are taken from the North Sea, while for the UK and Denmark, around 50% of the landings in value terms is caught in the North Sea (Marine Fisheries Agency, 2005; STECF-SGECA, 2006 ). In total, over 2000 European vessels greater than 10 million overall length operate in the fishery (STECF-SGECA, 2006) , employing around 7000 crew. In some regions, fishing is a major regional employer and the region is considered fishery-dependent. These include several ports in the North coast of England and the Scottish Highlands and major ports in The Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium (Goulding et al., 2000) , all of which are considered dependent on the North Sea. The North Sea is characterised by a number of interacting fisheries. These employ different gear types and target different species, but given the multispecies nature of the region and less than perfect gear selectivity, the catch composition of each fleet segment differs more in terms of proportions of each species caught rather than composition per se. Several gear types are employed in the fishery, the two main gears being demersal trawl (targeting cod, haddock, saithe and plaice) and beam trawl (targeting sole and plaice). Other major gears include seines (targeting cod and haddock), nephrops trawl (targeting Nephrops), gillnets and longlines (both targeting cod and a range of other fish species). Considerable inshore potting also takes place targeting crabs and lobsters, while pelagic trawlers and purse seiners target herring and mackerel.
While all countries have vessels using all gear types, the UK and Denmark fleets are dominated by trawl gear (including seine), while Belgian and the Dutch vessels predominantly use beam trawl. This gear use reflects the allocation of quotas for each species to each Member State, with the UK and Denmark having the greatest share of cod and haddock quota, while The Netherlands and Belgium have the greatest share of sole and plaice quota.
The decline of the North Sea cod stocks
Fisheries scientists apply several reference points as guides for management. A key reference point is the limit biomass, B lim , the Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) below which recruitment is likely to be impaired and the probability of stock collapse high (Mace and Sissenwine, 1993) . If a stock falls below B lim , its productivity and therefore sustainability is negatively affected. The aim of fisheries management under the precautionary approach, then, is to prevent the SSB falling below B lim (Kell et al., 1999) . To ensure this, scientists advocate a precautionary level of biomass, B pa , the level of biomass at which the risk of being at (or below) B lim is small, even given uncertainty in stock assessments. Below B pa , there is also an increased risk of impaired recruitment.
The cod SSB in the North Sea has been estimated to have been below B pa since the early 1980s (Figure 2 ), despite reductions in TACs and the overall reduction in fleet size. The SSB has fallen below B lim since 2000 (ICES, 2005) . Research surveys and the results from models fitted to the commercial catch at age data indicate that the SSB is at about 20-25% of the level it was in the 1980s (ICES, 2005) . The fishery is also now thought to be heavily dependent on the annual recruitment to the fishery, with the catch being dominated by small, young fish, with only about 5% of individuals at age 1 surviving to age 5 (ICES, 2005) . Despite the decline in the stock to below the precautionary level since the early 1980s, TACs have generally remained above the levels recommended by ICES (Figure 3 ). The stock assessment process has to contend with considerable uncertainty and policy makers have been reluctant to greatly reduce the quotas given this uncertainty due to the more certain financial impact this would have on the fishing industry and regional economies dependent on fishing in the short term (Mardle and Pascoe, 2002) . In many countries participating in the North Sea fisheries, maintaining regional employment was considered more important than improving profitability in fisheries (e.g. see Wattage et al., 2005) . The abundance of other species important to North Sea fleets has been more variable in the last decade. Both haddock and saithe stocks have doubled over the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . In contrast, stocks of sole and whiting have declined substantially.
Economic performance
Information of the economic performance of a number of key fleet segments operating in European waters is reported annually (STECF-SGECA, 2006) . The reduction in quotas for the key species had a substantial impact on the average profitability per vessel for the North Sea demersal trawl and seine fleet segments over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] (Table 1 , see also Pascoe, 2006) , with most fleet segments earning negative returns to capital since 2000. Average profitability of beam trawlers also declined over the period, but most key fleet segments maintained positive full equity returns to capital prior to 2004.
Further cuts in quotas of most roundfish species of the order of between 30 and 50% were made in both 2004 and 2005 . An assessment of the financial impact of the 2005 quotas on UK vessels estimated that UK whitefish trawlers would experience losses on average of between 10 and 21% of earnings (STECF-SGECA, 2004 ). Higher fuel prices in 2005 are likely to further reduce the profitability of these vessels. Although the full equity returns to capital in Table 1 represent a predominantly financial measure of performance (although they do take into consideration non-cash costs associated with owner-operator labour and depreciation), they are indicative of the lack of resource rent being generated in the fishery. Mardle and Pascoe (2002) estimated the potential resource rent in the fisheries to be in the order of €200 million a year based on 1995 costs and prices and associated optimal fish stocks. In contrast, the nine fleet segments alone in Table 1 produced a combined full equity loss of −€45 million in 2004 and an implicit resource rent of −€90 million (based on total capital of €900 million and a 5% opportunity cost of capital). Given this, the fishery is severely economically overexploited.
Management responses
In 2001, a cod closure area was introduced as an interim measure in a bid to prevent the cod stock from further deteriorating (Council Regulation (EC) No 259/2001). The area was closed to any fishing activity during this period, with the exception of purse seining and trawling for sand eels and pelagics. This temporary closed area was designed to cover the main spawning period of cod in the North Sea and was in force throughout the period from 14 February to 30 April 2001. Fishing effort restrictions were also implemented from 1 February 2003 for vessels of overall length greater than or equal to 10 million (Table 2 ). This restricted the number of days per month different types of vessels (i.e. using different gear types) could employ in different parts of the North Sea (Council Regulation (EC) No 671/2003). These restrictions were designed to be provisional measures only until a longer-term management plan for the stocks was finalised.
In December 2003, the Agriculture and Fisheries Council agreed on a longer-term cod recovery plan. The management plan focuses on cod stocks in the several areas, of which the North Sea was one (Council Regulation (EC) No. 423/2004) . The stock recovery plan specifies the criteria for setting both TACs and the number of days that can be fished. The general principle of the recovery plans is to set TACs and days fished such that the stock will increase by 30% annually. However, increases and decreases in TACs between years are restricted to be no more than 15%, even if greater changes may be required to achieve the stock increase objective. At the individual vessel level, the days at sea limits introduced in 2003 were also continued. The number of days that a vessel can operate each month in the North Sea is limited depending on gear type used, although this restriction is only binding over 11 months of the year with January effectively having no restrictions on the number of days fished. Baseline limits were established for all fleets in the North Sea that effectively halved the number of days that trawlers could operate each month. Member States that decommissioned some of the fleet could reallocate the associated days to the vessels remaining in the fishery. For example, for the UK fleet, additional decommissioning programmes introduced in 2003 enabled these baselines to be increased by five days for the remaining demersal trawlers and two days for beam trawlers (Fisheries Departments of the UK, 2004), effectively increasing the number of days these vessels could fish each month by 50% and 15%, respectively. While the number of days that individual vessels could fish was increased, the total number of days a fleet segment could operate was still restricted. However, as the least efficient vessels are often the first to leave through decommissioning (Clark et al., 2005; Pascoe and Coglan, 2000) , it is likely that total effective effort increased. The 2003 days-at-sea restriction was found to have a substantial negative impact on fleet profitability (Pascoe, 2006) , as would be expected. Although a decline in profitability is apparent in Table 2 , this could have been explained by changes in prices, costs, stocks or management. Using a restricted profit function, Pascoe (2006) demonstrated that the effort restriction was the major contributor to the decline in fleet profits in 2003.
In the longer term cod recovery programme, the days-at-sea are transferable. That is, a vessel may transfer some or all of its days to another vessel in a given month, such that the total number of days fished is not exceeded. Transfers between different sized vessels are controlled by ensuring that the total kilowatt-days fished is not exceeded. For example, a vessel with a 100 kW engine would need to transfer ten days to a vessel with a 1000 kW engine in order to allow it to fish for one extra day (Fisheries Departments of the UK, 2004).
The causes of biological and economic overexploitation of North Sea fish stocks
The propensity for poorly managed fisheries to become overexploited is well recognised. While a range of management restrictions has been imposed in the fisheries of the North Sea, these have not been sufficient to counter the incentives to overexploit the resource. The fisheries have been primarily managed through command and control based systems, primarily aggregate quotas and effort controls. The fisheries are complex, with different fleets from different countries using different gears to catch varying combinations of a wide range of fish species. Earlier management measures ignored this complexity, essentially assuming a set of single stock fisheries persecuted by a set of homogeneous fishers, creating incentives for capacity in the fleets to increase rather than decrease.
Management of European fisheries is also institutionally complex and this has added to difficulties in implementing appropriate management systems. In the EU, Member States maintain management responsibility for the fisheries within their respective territorial seas, whilst the European Commission (EC) maintains management responsibility for the waters encompassed by the rest of the EU Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Under the CFP, each country is allocated a share of the stocks that are jointly exploited. These shares are fixed under the 'Principle of General Stability' that aims to ensure that all Member States retain the same share of the resource that they had when the CFP was formulated (see Morin, 2000) . Aggregate quotas for key stocks are set by a Council of Ministers based on advice from International Commission for Exploitation of the Sea (ICES). As noted previously, however, ICES advice is just one element of the quota setting process, as Ministers take into consideration other factors, such as how quota changes will affect their constituent fleets. Political bargaining often results in quotas being set higher than the recommended level, as seen in Figure 3 .
Once allocated, how quotas are taken is the responsibility of the Member State. Until recently, the most common approach has been to allow the fleets to fish these quotas competitively. However, in more recent years, some countries (particularly UK, Denmark and The Netherlands) have introduced individual quota allocations with varying degrees of transferability. The individual quotas are generally expressed in terms of quota units, where the value of a unit varies in proportion to the TAC (effectively a percentage share). The allocation process varies across the countries. For example, the UK and Dutch quota units were allocated based on the individual's historical catch, whereas Danish quota units were initially allocated equally to vessels based on their vessel size class (Davidse et al., 1999) . Until recently, the Danish quotes were non-transferable, whereas annual and permanent quota transfers are permitted between UK and Dutch fishers within their own national fleets.
Under the principle of relative stability, quota transfers -temporary or permanent -are not permitted between individuals of different Member States. That is, they can only be traded between fishers within a given country.
2 However, free movement of labour, commodities and capital throughout the EU (Morin, 2000; van Hoof, 2004) have resulted in some de facto transfers of quota. Quota currently changes hands between Member States in the form of 'quota hopping', where vessels reflagging in another Member State in order to purchase quota. The vessel nominally forms part of the new Member State's fleet, although effectively operates as a foreign vessel (i.e. operate out of the foreign ports with associated benefits flowing primarily to the home State rather than the flagged State).
The UK has seen considerable development of Dutch ownership in the UK beam trawl fleet operating in the North Sea (Hatcher et al., 2002) , with many formerly UK-flagged vessels based in The Netherlands. Most Member States have introduced licensing conditions that aim to reduce the attractiveness of such a loophole. In the UK, this includes the requirement for UK-licensed vessels to demonstrate an economic link with local fishing communities. These economic links are defined as either 1 landing at least 50% by weight of the vessel's catch of quota stocks into the UK 2 employing a crew of whom at least 50% are normally resident in a UK coastal area 3 incurring a significant level of operating expenditure in the UK for goods and services provided in UK coastal areas or 4 demonstrating an economic link by other means that provides sufficient benefit to populations dependent on fisheries and related industries (DEFRA, 2006) .
This creates inefficiencies for vessels that aim to primarily operate from 'foreign' ports, so 'quota-hoping' has not seen widespread adoption in European fleets. A consequence of the historical management system employed in the North Sea has been the generation and persistence of overcapacity in the fleets. This is in spite of a series of decommissioning schemes that have been implemented in the last decade in a bid to reduce the level of excess capacity (CEC, 2000) . A consequence of overcapacity in the North Sea fisheries is in an inefficient use of resources employed in the fisheries. Further, overcapacity creates incentives to avoid quota controls and land over-quota fish (Ward et al., 2004) . CEC (2000) estimated that, in 2000, there was more than 40% overcapacity in the EU fleet as a whole. Lindebo (2005) estimated that, in 1998, the North Sea beam trawl fleet could be reduced by 23% and still maintain the same catch levels, with potential reductions of 38% for the UK portion of the fleet. More recent studies have suggested that, at least in the case of the UK, the combination of additional decommissioning programmes and the introduction of individual quotas with limited transferability has resulted in reductions of the level of overcapacity (see, e.g. Pascoe and Hatcher, 2006; Tingley and Pascoe, 2005) . Pascoe and Hatcher (2006) estimated that, in 2004, the same harvest levels could be taken with only around 5% fewer of the English fleet and 8% fewer of the Scottish fleet.
FAO (2002) identified overcapacity as the single key problem afflicting marine capture fisheries resources. However, overcapacity and unsustainability are both consequences of the same set of economic incentives that arise through the lack of well defined property rights (Ward et al., 2004) . In regulated open access conditions (such as exist under competitive TACs), there is little incentive for fishers to restrict their output; there is no benefit to the individual fisher in reducing harvesting output to protect the stock because his or her share will simply be taken by others. The resulting situation is one where both yields and economic benefits are below their potential levels (Ward et al., 2004) .
Most countries in Europe have recognised the existence of overcapacity in the fisheries in which they participate. As noted earlier, decommissioning or buyback, programmes have been used in most countries in order to achieve their target capacity levels defined in terms of Gross Tonnage (GT) and total engine power (i.e. physical measures of capacity). While these schemes have been successful in reducing vessel numbers, total tonnage has not decreased to the same degree (Figure 4) . The greatest reduction in both vessel numbers and tonnage of the four main countries operating in the North Sea has occurred in the UK. As noted previously, the level of overcapacity in the UK is now believed to be relatively low compared to previous estimates. In addition, the EU adopted a boat replacement policy in 2003 that is linked to a set of capacity targets. Total fleet capacity, defined in terms of both total engine power and total GT, is capped for each country at a 2003 reference level. New vessels can only enter the fleet if sufficient tonnage and engine power is removed. A 35% penalty is also imposed on new vessels greater than 100 GT both on GT and engine power, with the objective of offsetting any efficiency gains associated with the new vessels (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1438/2003). However, as the regulation relates to the national fleet, fleet capacity can still increase in some fisheries through reductions in others.
Future management of North Sea fisheries?
A common criticism of European fisheries management is that it has been overly centralised, politically motivated and slow to respond. As a result, fishers feel alienated from the management process, often resulting in non-compliant behaviour (e.g. see Hatcher and Gordon, 2005) . A review of European fisheries management in 2002 proposed an increased role for stakeholder group participation. This objective is being achieved by establishing Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) to bring stakeholders together, enhance communications with the scientific community and to permit discussions between various interest groups about options for fisheries management. As a result of this increased stakeholder participation, RACs are expected to improve the sustainability of the marine resource, biologically, economically and socially. The RACs, however, are only advisory and the Commission is under no obligation to accept this advice.
The North Sea Regional Advisory Council (NSRAC) was the first RAC to become operational within Europe. It was created in November 2004 in Edinburgh and grew out of the North Sea Commission Fisheries Partnership, a body formed in 2001 to bring together scientists and fishers from the countries contiguous with the North Sea. Although it is too early to determine the success or otherwise of the NSRAC, it has drawn commitment from both industry and Member States. The NSRAC has already commissioned several studies to consider alternative management strategies for the North Sea.
Implicit in the establishment of RACs is the prospect of more regionally focused management. While the North Sea exists as a physical entity, there has, in the past, not been explicit management of 'North Sea fisheries'. Under the CFP, physical vessel capacity is managed through total constraints on vessel tonnage and engine power at the national level, with no limits on where these vessels can be employed. 4 In many cases, vessels can change their fishing gear (and subsequently their activity) depending on the relative availability of stocks. For example, there has been a considerable shift in the UK fleet from otter trawl to Nephrops trawl arising from the decline in cod quotas and apparent increased abundance of Nephrops. While such flexibility may be desirable from the fishers' perspective, there exist the possibility that overcapacity is just transferred from one activity to another.
The transfer of fishing capacity from one fishery to another is potentially a major constraint to the development of a profitable and sustainable industry. Regional fisheries management is necessary to contain such activities, especially if management is to continue focusing on input controls. Management of regional fisheries requires each region and ideally each fishery within a region, to be considered as a separate entity for management. However, given the interaction at the species level of the different fisheries in the North Sea (e.g. trawl and beam trawl fisheries catch similar species in widely differing mixes), multilevel management is required (i.e. management objectives for individual fleets that take into consideration the entire set of interacting fisheries).
Currently, most European fisheries (including the North Sea) are managed on a stock-by-stock basis (Jennings, 2004) . That is, advice is presented on each stock independent of how it interacts with other stocks or with different fishing activities. The failure of this type of management has become widely accepted, especially in mixed fisheries where catch targets (TACs) may be incompatible with the catch composition of the fleets, resulting in either overquota catches or discarding (or both). In addition, concerns have arisen regarding the potential ecological impacts poor management may have on ecosystems.
In response to such concerns, the European Commission is now committed to move towards ecosystem-based management. An Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF) conveys a process that specifically accommodates ecosystem processes in policy development and is geographically specified, incorporates ecosystem knowledge and uncertainties, incorporates external influences on the ecosystem and balances various societal objectives of concern (Sissenwine and Murawski, 2004) . How such a system will translate into practice, however, is unclear, although considerable attention is currently focused on the development of more environmentally friendly fishing gear. Consideration is also being given in ICES to multispecies stock assessments, although there is still considerable uncertainty associated with the estimation of TACs that take into consideration multispecies interactions. Similarly, consideration is also being given to fleet based advice (i.e. taking into consideration the catch compositions) and multiannual management. The perceived benefit of multiannual management is that large fluctuations from year to year should be avoided (reducing the level of uncertainty facing the industry) and longer term recovery strategies can be developed.
Increased stakeholder involvement may increase the perceived legitimacy of fisheries regulations and thereby improve compliance (Hatcher and Gordon, 2005) , while ecosystems approaches to management may lead to more appropriate TAC setting. However, these do not change the fundamental problems facing the North Sea fisheries, namely the lack of clearly defined property rights. The introduction of a European-wide Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system has been suggested as a means to allocate property rights to fishers, while at the same time assisting with the problem of overcapacity (see, e.g. Hentrich and Salomon, 2006; van Hoof, 2004) . There is considerable reluctance, however, by Member States to engage in such a management system, largely as it may result in parts of the current fishing activity being transferred to other countries, temporarily if not permanently. This reluctance is driven more by concern over the potential impact on coastal communities rather than a concern for the efficiency of the industry as a whole or the sustainability of the resource. As noted previously, fishers are already effectively trading quota internationally through the 'quota-hopping' activities, although this has been made a less attractive option through the imposition of domestic 'economic links' criteria.
Trade in quotas between countries may not be as substantial as generally perceived. Most countries have already specialised to a large degree. For example, the UK and Denmark catch most of the cod, the UK takes most of the haddock, France takes most of the saithe while The Netherlands and Belgium catch mostly flatfish (sole and plaice). Each country has developed a comparative advantage in a limited set of species. Consequently, an outflow of plaice quota from the UK to The Netherlands, for example, is likely to be offset by an inflow of cod quota. Mardle and Pascoe (2000) examined the impact of the relative stability condition on the potential profitability and employment levels in the North Sea and found that removing relative stability (i.e. allowing individuals in different countries to trade quota) would have a relatively neutral impact on employment in each country, while generally improving the level of profitability of the fleet by around 12%.
5 Further, the better allocation of quotas between the countries was estimated to reduce the level of discarding.
A potential problem with quota trading between Member States is differences in the treatment of subsidies. While fisheries are no longer subsidised directly, there exists differences in fuel excise rates, value added taxes, income taxes and concessions, social security requirements and management levies that affect the costs of production in the different countries. Consequently, there is no 'level playing field' and comparative advantage could reflect different tax systems rather than economic efficiency. Harmonising the tax systems is currently a priority in Europe (CEC, 1997; Zodrow, 2003) and will reduce the potential for tax competition to distort the flow of quota from one country to another.
Considerable interested has also been expressed in the more widespread use of Individual Transferable Effort Quotas (ITEQs). These are believed to have some of the capacity adjustment benefits of ITQs without the problems associated with TACs in multispecies fisheries (e.g. discarding and overquota catch). ITEQs, however, have their own difficulties, such as accounting for different productivity effects of different gears, vessel sizes and even skippers, as well as technology creep over time. The transferable days-at-sea programme of the cod recovery plan in the North Sea is a move towards this system of management. However, under the current system, permanent trades are not permitted, so the capacity-reducing potential is not being achieved.
The dual effort and catch quota system adds increasing complexity to fleet adjustment in the fisheries. Fishers need not only to purchase (or lease) additional catch quota, but also additional days in order to take the quota. The additional transactions costs involved in this process reduce the benefits seeking additional quotas, thereby slowing adjustment. However, the evolution of property rights -even if slowly -is still a move in the right direction. Iceland also went through a stage of a dual individual effort-catch quota system before moving to a full ITQ system. Icelandic fisheries are now both biologically and economically healthy, largely as a result of their ITQ system (Arnason et al., 2004) . Attempting to introduce change too quickly in Europe is likely to result in the systems never being given the chance to develop.
Implementing ITQs in the North Sea will not be without its challenges, especially given the multifleet, multispecies nature of the fisheries. However, ITQs have been successfully implemented in similarly complex fisheries elsewhere in the world (e.g. New Zealand and Australia's South East Fishery) and lessons could be learned from these experiences. The EAF also adds complexity when combined with an ITQ system, as more than just the target species need to be assessed and allocated TACs. There remains a role for other management measures, such as area closures and marine protected areas, to help achieve these environmental objectives.
Conclusion
It is abundantly clear that the current situation in European fisheries is not sustainable, both biologically and economically. Fish stocks in the North Sea have long been subjected to high exploitation rates and overcapacity resulting in reductions in biomass, reduced catch rates and fleet profitability.
The main cause of the current state of the North Sea, despite decades of management, is the lack of well-defined property rights, command and control approaches to management and the resultant build up of overcapacity. The problem has been compounded by inappropriate TACs and the existence of subsidies. The move to increased stakeholder involvement in fisheries management and also the change in the focus from single species management to an ecosystems-based approach will help create an environment in which better management decisions (in terms of TACs e.g.), can potentially be made. Further, the removal of subsidies will reduce the incentives for capacity to further expand.
Various forms of property rights are slowly evolving in the North Sea. Individual quota systems are developing in several Member States, with varying levels of transferability. Similarly, individual effort quota systems are also evolving. This dual effort-catch quota system, while adding unnecessary complexity to management and impeding rather than enhancing adjustment in the fishery, may be a necessary stage in the development of rights based management systems in the North Sea. Given the complexity arising from the number of differing (national) vested interested in the fisheries and the political reluctance to risk losing what is still seen as a national resource, it is likely that this evolution will proceed slowly, but inevitably towards a fully integrated fishery-wide ITQ system.
